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When do electoral institutions trigger electoral misconduct?  
 
Abstract: 
Drawing on two complementary mechanisms, this article explores the question of 
whether electoral institutions and conditions of electoral competition create incentives 
to promote electoral misconduct in young or developing democracies. The first 
mechanism explains how majoritarian institutions like disproportional electoral systems 
are more likely to trigger electoral fraud than consensus electoral institutions like PR. 
However, for this mechanism to be activated, the incumbent must feel effectively 
threatened by the opposition. To better understand the way this mechanism works, the 
electoral history of the country also needs to be taken into consideration. Democracies 
which have a historical record of running clean elections are less likely to experience 
fraud than countries with a history of electoral misconduct. I test these theoretical 
claims using a dataset that contains relevant information for 323 parliamentary elections 
in 59 new or developing democracies in the period between 1960 and 2006. The 
empirical analysis shows a strong and robust empirical support for the two mechanisms. 
Keywords: democracy, electoral fraud, political representation, developing countries, 
electoral institutions. 
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Introduction 
Under what conditions is electoral misconduct more likely to happen? Since 
early 1990s, the number of regimes holding elections has increased exponentially but 
some of those elections have not managed to meet the conditions to establish well-
functioning democracies1. Electoral misconduct, or electoral fraud, has been identified 
as one important factor why democracy has not fully consolidated in some of these 
countries2. According to Donno and Roussias3, approximately 15% of the democratic 
elections in Latin America and post-communist countries between 1990 and 2004 failed 
to comply with some of the recognized international principles for genuine democratic 
elections.4 Using international reports, Kelley also shows that about 50% of such 
documents indicated major or moderate problems in the elections occurred between 
1980 and 20045. 
In this article, I argue that a key reason why electoral misconduct is observed in 
some new or developing democracies has to do with the institutional design regulating 
the functioning of elections. This article shows that when upcoming electoral contests 
are expected to be close, majoritarian institutions, like disproportional electoral systems, 
create incentives for incumbents to limit competition unlawfully. The mechanism, 
however, is not straightforward. To properly understand the combined effect of electoral 
rules with levels of political competition, one must also take into account the electoral 
history of the country. 
A rich and growing literature has focused on the consequences of electoral 
misconduct on party systems, electoral turnout or the quality of elections. A general 
conclusion of these works is that electoral fraud limits the number of competitors; 
decreases turnout; reduces the quality of elections and increases the political survival of 
cheating incumbents6. 
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The literature analysing the reasons for the use of electoral misconduct is, 
however, still developing. There are two approaches that provide theoretical and 
empirical evidence to understand why electoral fraud happens. One set of explanations 
focuses on the role played by economic conditions or state capacity in facilitating 
electoral malpractices by incumbents. Lehoucq and Molina's study on Costa Rica finds 
socioeconomic conditions, such as inequality and literacy, to be major factors that 
explain electoral fraud7. Changing economic and labour market conditions are also 
related to electoral misconduct as Varela-Ortega8 shows for the case of Spain during the 
Restoration period and as Mares9 and Ziblatt10 find using data from Imperial Germany. 
Looking at state capacity as an indicator of public-good provisions, Fortin-Rittberger 
shows that fraud is unlikely observed in countries with solid infrastructures11. 
Institutional explanations also account for why some elections are rigged while 
others are not. Here, electoral rules and electoral competition are key determinants of 
electoral misconduct. Birch concludes that electoral fraud is more likely to be observed 
in single-member than in multi-member districts given the mechanical effect of such 
electoral systems and the more personalistic role candidates play in smaller districts12. 
Kolev shows that the use of proportional representation (PR) electoral formulas 
increases the quality of elections only in ethnically polarised countries; in countries with 
low ethnic fragmentation, however, quality increases when majoritarian electoral 
formulas are used instead. In this institutional explanation of electoral fraud, political 
competition is also considered but neither the theory nor the empirical evidence is 
unanimous about how electoral closeness is related to misconduct13. Magaloni develops 
a formal model whereby the unity of all opposition forces prevents incumbents from 
engaging in fraudulent acts14. Empirically, Lehoucq and Molina15 show that fraud in 
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Costa Rica was more likely when electoral competition was high; but Simpser16 finds 
that fraud was used by dominant parties to intimidate minor opposition parties. 
What these explanations are generally missing is an analysis of the combined 
effect of specific electoral system designs under varying levels of expected electoral 
competition. This is the main contribution of this article. In the following pages, I 
theorise two complementary mechanisms that provide a novel understanding of the role 
electoral institutions play in understanding electoral misconduct.  
The first, and main, mechanism is based on the assumption that the dichotomy 
between majoritarian and proportional electoral institutions is better observed when 
there is an expectation that the forthcoming elections will be close. Electoral races under 
distinguishable types of electoral rule may produce different types of winners and 
losers17. Winner-takes-all institutions create scenarios whereby political power is 
exercised almost monopolistically by parties getting the majority of the electoral 
support; however, in proportional representation institutions, political power is 
redistributed according to the concrete popular endorsement each party receives18. 
Following this logic, electoral misconduct is more likely to occur in less proportional 
than in more permissive electoral systems but only when electoral competition is 
expected to be tight. Since absolute political winners and losers emerge from restrictive 
electoral systems, ruling parties will use a variety of strategies to minimise the risk of 
losing power when elections are expected to be close. Such strategies may include 
unlawful actions limiting the chances of winning by members of the opposition. This 
behaviour is, however, not expected if proportional representation rules are used since 
these electoral systems do not generate absolute but relative political winners and 
losers19. 
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A second, and complementary, mechanism to explain electoral misconduct has 
to do with electoral history and the reputation of political actors. The effect of 
institutions and competition on promoting electoral misconduct decreases if countries 
have a continuous historical record of holding clean elections. Unfolding the reasons 
why this is the case is, however, not straightforward. A reason that is suggested in this 
article has to do with the adoption of electoral management bodies like independent 
electoral commissions that effectively prevent actors from using electoral 
malpractices20. 
I test these theoretical mechanisms using a large dataset which covers 323 
parliamentary elections between 1960 and 2006 that occurred in young or developing 
democracies. Parliamentary elections account for a large variation in electoral rules and 
levels of competition; in addition to this, the generalisation of the findings is increased 
by analysing a large sample of countries and years. 
This paper is structured in several sections. Following the introduction, I develop 
the main theoretical framework that explains in detail the relationship between electoral 
misconduct and electoral institutions. Then I define the dependent variable and present 
the method and data used in the empirical analysis. The empirical discussion is followed 
by a series of robustness tests. The article concludes by discussing some venues for 
future research. 
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The dynamics of electoral institutions in explaining electoral misconduct. 
Political institutions are arrangements that determine who holds and how to 
exercise power21. The distinction between majoritarian and consensual institutions first 
developed by Arendt Lijphart is a good example of this idea22. Lijphart´s point of 
departure is that in heterogeneous and polarised societies with a clear dominant group, 
majoritarian institutions exacerbate that superiority by marginalising the rest of the 
groups in society. However, this is not the case when consensus institutions are adopted 
as they “share, diffuse, separate, divide, decentralize and limit power”23. 
The electoral system is a typical institution that clearly reflects this consensus 
and majoritarian distinction. It is also an institution that is useful to extend Lijphart’s 
original concern on conflict to other politically relevant phenomena like corruption. 
Studies explaining cross-country variations in the level of political corruption start with 
an hypothesis based on the idea that political actors´ interests may differ depending on 
how they are selected. Political rent-seeking may be a strategy for some representatives 
if re-election, for example, is costly. While, the empirical findings are mixed, there is a 
clear consensus on the importance of electoral rules and the type of representation that 
they generate as drivers of political corruption. Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman24 show 
that PR electoral systems are positively associated with high levels of political 
corruption, a finding that is also consistent with the results obtained by Persson, 
Tabellini and Trebbi25. However, Chang and Golden26 argue that it is the combined 
effect of district magnitudes and the type of ballots what best explain political 
corruption. 
The relationship between electoral rules and type of ballot has also been used in 
the literature explaining electoral misconduct27. The most canonical example is Birch´s 
study on Central and Eastern Europe28. In this research, Birch explores the relationship 
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between electoral rules and electoral misconduct developing, like some studies on 
political corruption, a theory based on incentives to cultivate a personal vote29. She 
concludes that electoral fraud is more likely to be observed in single- than in multi-
member districts given the incentive structure of the former to limit electoral 
competition around particular candidates rather than parties.  
The main theoretical contribution of this article shares with studies on corruption 
the importance of electoral rules. It also agrees with Birch´s theory that single-member 
districts are more likely to promote electoral misconduct than multi-member districts. 
However, the reason why this occurs is not due to the incentives of individual 
candidates to win the seat at stake, but rather as part of a broader strategy adopted by the 
incumbent´s party to survive in power. This strategy is more likely to be put forward 
when the incumbent feels that the opposition party poses a real threat to their dominant 
position. As such, even though actions may be taking place at the district level, the 
decision may be coming from the central government. 
For example, during the 1970 elections in Costa Rica, electoral campaigns were 
subsidised by the State. The government was, then, ultimately responsible for providing 
financial endowments to the different parties so that they could run their campaigns. 
This procedure was eventually manipulated by the government (run by the National 
Liberation Party) in order to make political competition harder for rival parties, 
particularly the UN (National Unification Party) or the PFN (National Front Party). As a 
result, political rallies organised by these parties during the electoral campaign were 
disrupted by supporters of rival parties compromising the conditions of political 
competition.30 
The link between conditions of electoral competition and political survival has 
mostly been used to explain institutional change but not often to explain the use of 
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electoral fraud31. This article contributes to this literature by developing a novel 
mechanism that links the performance of electoral systems under certain levels of 
political competition with political survival. By doing so, electoral misconduct is 
explained as an action adopted by a political actor who seeks to maximise their tenure in 
office.  
Following Lijphart32, what defines majoritarian institutions is that they create 
absolute winners and losers whereas consensus arrangements generate relative ones; 
however, to clearly perceive these effects, the conditions under which electoral 
competition takes place must be considered. By electoral competition, I simply mean 
the risk incumbents face of being deposed by the opposition. In consensus institutions, 
like PR electoral systems, the intrinsic redistributive nature of the system grants access 
to power to all groups regardless of how close the opposition and incumbent parties are. 
These institutional and electoral conditions should, on average, not encourage the use of 
unlawful electoral actions by the incumbent: even if the elections were lost, the 
incumbent would not be completely barred from exercising power. In the event of 
losing an election, the incumbent, or the incumbent´s party, would still retain a certain 
number of seats and access to political resources given the proportionality of the 
electoral system. However, when majoritarian electoral systems are in place the picture 
may be different depending on how incumbents assess the risk of being deposed by the 
opposition. 
If the upcoming elections are expected to occur in a context of clear electoral 
advantage for the ruling party, i.e. where the opposition party is weak, political losers 
know they have little chance of accessing power and, more importantly, incumbents 
remain confident that they will continue to be the political winners.33 However, the 
party in government may feel threatened when the elections are expected to be close and 
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the electoral system is designed to only favour the electoral winner34. In this scenario, 
majoritarian electoral systems, i.e. small district sizes combined with majoritarian 
electoral formulas, may create incentives for an incumbent to rig the election given the 
real possibility of becoming an absolute political loser35. The following hypothesis 
summarises this theoretical expectation: 
H1: Electoral misconduct is likely to be observed when majoritarian electoral 
systems are used in a context when elections are expected to be close. 
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Elections and reputation as mechanisms to explain electoral misconduct 
A complementary mechanism explaining electoral fraud refers to the cumulative 
history of electoral misconduct. When elections occur in countries that have developed 
a sustained historical record of holding clean elections, then the risk of observing 
electoral misconduct declines significantly despite the existence of institutional and 
electoral conditions that could promote fraud as developed in the previous section.  
Logically, this mechanism is linked to a prior question related to why some 
countries never experience episodes of electoral fraud. While the analysis of this 
question in full is beyond this research, a tentative explanation can be outlined here 
based on the idea of institutions as credible commitments36. As the literature has shown, 
credible commitments are decisions adopted by, for example, rulers to convince other 
political actors about their seriousness in a particular course of action decided by the 
ruler himself. Examples of credible commitments in this sense are the holding of 
elections by autocrats37 or the adoption of limited government38.  
In the context of electoral integrity, examples of credible commitment are the 
adoption of electoral management bodies (EMB) like independent electoral 
commissions or allowing international actors to monitor the elections39. In fact, such 
credible commitments on election management has become an international norm 
signalling the intention of domestic political actors to comply with election results40.  
When such electoral management institutions are truly independent and 
effectively serve the purpose for which they were designed, the quality of the election 
may increase and electoral competition could improve41. For the purpose of this article, 
the assumption is that by adopting independent and effective electoral management 
bodies, countries create the institutional conditions to generate a historical record of 
clean elections. It is the presence of such a record that also explains the outcome of 
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observing electoral misconduct regardless of the existence of other conditions that could 
promote it. The following two examples illustrate this idea well.  
Ghana has been holding competitive and periodic elections since 1996 and most 
of the elections have been monitored by international bodies which have declared them 
to comply with international standards. Also, following the adoption of the 1992 
constitution, an independent electoral commission was adopted to guarantee the 
transparency of the elections. According to the V-Dem dataset,42 the level autonomy of 
EMBs in Ghana is considered to be of the highest quality indicating full impartiality43. 
In 2012, the presidential race was decided by an electoral difference of less than 3% of 
the votes. Akufo-Addo, the leader of the opposition, contested the electoral outcome 
alleging electoral fraud44. The allegations were investigated by the Electoral 
Commission as well as the Supreme Court and the fraud claims were rejected in both 
cases. Akufo-Addo accepted his defeat following these verdicts. 
Kenya became a democracy in 1998 and, like Ghana, also invited international 
electoral organisations to monitor the presidential elections of 2002 where a number of 
irregularities were observed.45 Furthermore, according to the V-Dem dataset, the 
election management bodies in Kenya between 2002 and 2006 were considered to be 
partial and clearly biased towards the party in government. In the 2007 presidential and 
parliamentary elections, the difference between the two main candidates was less than 
3%46 but, compared to Ghana, in Kenya the elections were considered fraudulent by the 
voters as well as by international organisations who were monitoring this electoral 
process.47 Both Kenya and Ghana use pure majoritarian electoral systems. Following 
this theoretical assessment, a second hypothesis can be stated: 
H2: Having a historical record of running clean elections reduces the probability 
of observing electoral misconduct. 
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Limiting political competition as a form of electoral misconduct 
Electoral misconduct is defined in the literature broadly. Lehoucq defines 
electoral fraud as a concealed and unlawful conduct that may potentially affect election 
results48. Likewise, Birch defines electoral fraud as those "activities that lead to a 
violation of the ‘level playing field’ that is the ideal of electoral processes."49. So 
defined, electoral misconduct covers any actions which occur before, during or after the 
occurrence of elections.  
For the purpose of this article, electoral misconduct, the dependent variable, 
refers to concrete actions aimed at limiting political competition.50 Such actions are 
expected to occur mostly before an election and include practices carried out by the 
government to prevent opposition leaders, or their voters, from participating freely in 
the upcoming election.51 More concretely, given a certain level of political competition 
in a democracy, electoral misconduct will occur when: a) Opposition leaders are 
prevented from running for elections; or b) The government intentionally uses some 
form of formal or informal coercive power against the opposition in order to clearly 
limit political competition.52 
To operationalise these actions limiting political completion during an election, I 
have relied on the information provided by the National Elections Across Democracy 
and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset53. This dataset contains qualitative information on 
major election events occurred from 1945-2011 in new and developing democracies. 
The NELDA dataset allows one to look at rather detailed pieces of information about 
key aspects of any election to fine tune the definition of the dependent variable.54 To 
this end, the dependent variable is operationalised on the basis of variables NELDA13 
and NELDA15. When the information in the NELDA dataset was not clear, I relied on 
election observation reports from international institutions like the Organisation for 
13 
 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (UE) or the African 
Union (AU). 55  
Figure 1 shows the yearly proportion of elections where episodes of electoral 
misconduct aimed at limiting political competition took place together with the total 
number of elections. The graph indicates that electoral competition was severely 
compromised in the period between 1960 and 1980 when the number of developing 
democracies was small. As the number of new democracies increased specially after 
1989, electoral misconduct became stable averaging less than 20%. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Electoral misconduct between 1960 and 2006 
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Method and Data 
The above theoretical mechanisms are tested using a dataset that covers 323 
parliamentary elections that occurred in the period from 1960 to 2006 in 59 new or 
developing democracies.56 As discussed above, the dependent variable, electoral 
misconduct, is a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates that in a particular election, 
electoral actions targeting and compromising political competition were observed. 
Overall, electoral misconduct occurred in 17% of the sample. 
The hypotheses developed in the previous sections are tested sequentially. In 
both cases, probit models are used and errors are clustered by country to account for 
potential heteroskedasticity that the data may generate given its structure. All the 
models also include temporal fixed effects to account for unobserved variations that 
could be caused due to particular time dynamics. The variables of interest used in the 
models are the following: 
Electoral System refers to the proportionality of the electoral system. This 
variable is measured using the Aggregated Threshold Functions (ATF) as calculated by 
Ruiz-Rufino57. This indicator summarises in a unique value the combined effect of 
district magnitude and electoral formula providing the minimum proportion of votes 
nationwide required to win half of the seats in parliament. So defined, this indicator 
reflects the nature of electoral institution better than just average district magnitude. 
Higher values of ATF indicate greater proportionality58. ATF ranges from 0.08 
(Thailand 1983-2000) where multi-member districts are combined with super-
majoritarian electoral formulas to 0.49 which is observed in countries using a single 
district and a PR electoral formula like Slovakia59. 
Expected competition is a lagged variable and refers to the electoral gap (%) 
between the winner and the front-runner in the previous election. It ranges from 0.10% 
15 
 
(Venezuela 1978 and Comoros 1992) to 87% (Jamaica 1989). The data for this variable 
comes from various electoral sources60. 
Electoral misconduct history is a binary variable indicating whether or not a 
country has experienced electoral misconduct in any election in the past. Put differently, 
if a country receives a 0 in a particular election year, this indicates that misconduct 
never occurred prior to that particular election, however, if misconduct was observed in 
a given election, then, this variable is given the value 1 for all the subsequent elections.  
Along with the main independent variables, the following variables are also 
included in the models to control for path-dependence effects, institutional conditions 
and economic development: 
Past misconduct, is a lag variable of the dependent variable used to control for 
path-dependence effects. 
Previous elections, refers to the number of previous democratic elections held 
by each country in election year t since the adoption of democracy. It is a categorical 
variable where 0, the base category, indicate the first democratic election, 1 the second 
democratic elections and so on. This variable accounts for the potential effect that 
holding elections per ser can have in consolidating democracy61. The variable is 
operationalised using the DD dataset62 and the NELDA dataset.  
Authoritarian legacy is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when a country 
had a dominant party in the previous autocratic regime or not. This variable is 
operationalised using the regime classification made by Cheibub el al63. For example, 
Malawi is labelled as 1 since the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) had dominated political 
life since 1964 until the arrival of democracy. 
British legacy is a binary variable that takes a value 1 when a country was a 
former British colony. Both Authoritarian and British legacy variables are used in the 
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models to capture the dynamics of institutional origin. A similar approach is used by 
Brancati64. 
Ethnicity indicates the level of ethnic fractionalisation existing in each country. 
The data come from Alesina et al65. 
Conflict, is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if there was any type of intra-
country armed conflict during the inter-election period. This variable comes from the 
PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4-2009 dataset. 
GDP (log), reflects the logged values of GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ 
(World Bank). 
Trade, indicates the product of exports and imports of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP (World Bank). 
Agriculture, indicates the percentage contribution of agricultural activity to 
GDP (World Bank). 
 
Table 1 summarises the relevant information about the main independent and 
control variables. 
Table 1 - Summary of main variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Misconduct 323 0.170279 0.376461 0 1 
Electoral System 323 0.259015 0.110112 0.08 0.49 
Electoral gap 281 14.20164 13.97658 0.1 87 
Historical misconduct 323 0.359133 0.480491 0 1 
Electoral System change 242 0.002124 0.029402 -0.16 0.27 
British Legacy 323 0.22291 0.416844 0 1 
Authoritarian Legacy 323 0.204334 0.40384 0 1 
Conflict 323 0.232198 0.42289 0 1 
Ethnicity 322 0.436548 0.210432 0 0.8791 
GDP (log) 318 7.286309 1.094767 4.69389 9.575549 
Trade 314 1125.257 1122.52 14.17606 7479.361 
Agriculture 268 19.67832 13.28642 1.339242 63.39004 
Previous elections 322 3.431677 3.3474 0 16 
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Effect of electoral institutions and expected competition on misconduct 
The first hypothesis stated how electoral misconduct was likely to be observed 
when majoritarian electoral systems operated in a context in which elections were 
expected to be close. To test this claim, the following model is used: 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑐 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑝.𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐 ,𝑡 
+ 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
Where ES refers to the proportionality of the electoral system of country c in 
election year t and Exp. Com refers to the expected level of competition in country c in 
year t. Note however that the variable Expected Competition in the current election is 
operationalised using the electoral gap observed in the previous election, t-1. The idea is 
that incumbents use the last electoral information point that they have available to create 
an expectation about how competitive the upcoming elections might be. By using this 
strategy, the model reduces the level of potential endogeneity that could emerge if 
competition in year t were included instead. To capture the combined effect of the level 
of proportionality and the expected level of competition, an interaction term between 
these two terms is included. Finally, a vector of control variables is added and the model 
also controls for years fixed effects as indicated in the vector, 𝜗66. Table 2 shows the 
main results of this analysis. 
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Table 2 – Electoral results and expected competition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Baseline Electoral Electoral Competition Competition 
      
Electoral System -1.57* -2.59** -1.67 -10.85*** -11.12*** 
 (0.852) (1.228) (1.359) (2.749) (3.155) 
Expected competition    -0.08*** -0.08** 
    (0.028) (0.031) 
Interaction    0.28** 0.27** 
    (0.116) (0.123) 
Previous misconduct  0.94*** 0.76** 1.21*** 0.80* 
  (0.305) (0.305) (0.388) (0.423) 
British Legacy -0.17 -0.45 -0.32 -1.23*** -1.43*** 
 (0.270) (0.299) (0.366) (0.468) (0.482) 
Authoritarian Legacy 0.145 -0.44 -0.27 -0.81* -0.46 
 (0.249) (0.366) (0.439) (0.427) (0.607) 
GDP (log)  -0.12 -0.49** -0.32 -0.74** 
  (0.208) (0.205) (0.230) (0.311) 
Conflict  0.95*** 0.91*** 1.30*** 1.29*** 
  (0.263) (0.340) (0.363) (0.461) 
Ethnicity  -0.03 -0.12 0.01 -0.04 
  (0.460) (0.631) (0.663) (0.786) 
Trade  0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Agriculture  -0.01 -0.05*** -0.03 -0.09*** 
  (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.033) 
Constant -0.25 0.28 4.14* 4.20 10.57*** 
 (0.329) (2.062) (2.163) (2.924) (3.618) 
      
Observations 301 192 192 171 152 
Dummies past elections YES YES YES YES YES 
FE NO YEAR YEAR and 
REGION 
YEAR YEAR and 
REGION 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2 shows different estimations that are obtained using distinct model 
specifications. Model 1 is a baseline model where only institutional factors are 
considered. In this model, the coefficient for electoral system is negative and 
statistically significant. Models 2 and 3 refine the baseline model to include year fixed 
effects and the vector of control variables. These two models are like the ones used in 
Birch67 and show similar results but only when year fixed effects are considered. When 
this is the case, the effect of electoral system is, again, negative and statistically 
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significant. In other words, more majoritarian electoral systems increase the probability 
of observing electoral misconduct. However, if regional fixed effects68 are included, the 
effect of the electoral system disappears. 
Models 4 and 5 test the main theoretical claim of this article: electoral 
misconduct is better explained when electoral rules are considered together with the 
perceived level of competition in the upcoming elections. When incumbents feel that 
the opposition may win the election and, consequently, lose all power, then, one 
possible strategy is to engage in unlawful electoral practices. This theoretical 
expectation is fully confirmed in the empirical analysis. Model 4 shows that the 
interaction coefficient, as well as its individual components, have the expected 
directions and statistical significance69. Furthermore, the effects remain unaltered after 
the addition of regional fixed effects.70  
Figure 2 provides a more detailed interpretation of the main empirical finding. 
The graph shows the predicted probability of observing electoral misconduct once the 
effect of the interaction is considered using the minimum and the maximum value of the 
proportionality of the electoral system71. When electoral systems are highly 
proportional, i.e. high values of ATF, then probabilities are never different from zero 
regardless of the expected level of electoral competition. When these conditions exist, 
incumbents may feel that losing the election may not necessarily mean losing all power 
and that may explain why electoral misconduct is not part of their strategy. However, 
when competition is expected to be close and electoral rules are very restrictive, i.e. low 
values of ATF, then the political survival of the incumbent may be at risk. Under this 
scenario, electoral misconduct is part of the strategy used by the incumbent to retain 
power. More concretely, when the electoral gap is expected to be close to zero, i.e. both 
the incumbent and opposition parties are expected to have similar electoral support, the 
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probability of observing electoral fraud is above 60%. This probability decreases to 
about 30% when the expected distance between the incumbent and the opposition 
parties is about 20%. For expected values of competition greater than 30%, the 
predicted probabilities are no longer different from zero. This result confirms the 
validity of hypothesis 1. 
Figure 2 – Effect of expected level of competition and electoral rules. 
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The effect of electoral history on electoral misconduct 
The second hypothesis developed in this article complements the main 
explanatory mechanism by considering the historical record of running clean elections. 
To test this hypothesis, the previous model is reformulated as: 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑐 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡  ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑐,𝑡 
+ 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 
where the main variable to test is the effect of historical electoral misconduct of country 
c in election year t on the occurrence of electoral misconduct in country c in year t. Note 
that the vector of controls, 𝜃, now also includes the Electoral system and the Expected 
competition variables along with their interaction. The historical electoral misconduct 
variable is a binary indicator of how clean elections have been up to the election under 
study. As explained before, one assumption behind this variable is that it could be an 
indirect way of testing the existence of effective electoral management bodies. Recent 
datasets, like the V-Dem dataset, have collected data on the autonomy of EMBs but the 
use of such data in models like the one used here is problematic. This would be so 
because of the endogeneity that the inclusion of such variable would generate in the 
model. As the literature has explained, a key methodological issue regarding the use of 
variables reflecting the independence of EMB is the selection bias that is associated 
with these variables72. This problem does not exist when the variable reflecting 
historical electoral misconduct is used.  
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Table 3 shows the different models used to test the effect of historical electoral 
misconduct on electoral fraud. 
Table 3 – Electoral misconduct history results 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Competition Competition 
   
Electoral misconduct history 1.62*** 1.37*** 
 (0.393) (0.426) 
Electoral system -12.17*** -12.15*** 
 (3.101) (3.129) 
Expected competition -0.07** -0.06** 
 (0.028) (0.027) 
Interaction 0.27** 0.27** 
 (0.119) (0.116) 
British Legacy -1.82*** -1.82*** 
 (0.527) (0.513) 
Authoritarian Legacy -0.21 -0.11 
 (0.405) (0.530) 
GDP (log) -0.73*** -0.95*** 
 (0.250) (0.275) 
Conflict 1.57*** 1.36*** 
 (0.360) (0.415) 
Ethnicity 0.02 0.18 
 (0.631) (0.833) 
Trade 0.00** 0.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Agriculture -0.05*** -0.09*** 
 (0.018) (0.027) 
Constant 8.13*** 11.45*** 
 (3.073) (3.136) 
   
Observations 175 175 
Dummies past elections YES YES 
FE YEAR YEAR and 
REGION 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model 1 in Table 3 shows a positive and strongly statistical effect of historical 
electoral misconduct on the occurrence of electoral misconduct a result that is consistent 
with the previous models. The result is also robust when regional fixed effects are added 
in model 2. This result confirms hypothesis 2 and the two models corroborate the 
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expectation that in the absence of a history of electoral misconduct, the quality of 
current elections seems to be higher. To present this finding with greater clarity, Figure 
3 shows the predicted probability of observing electoral misconduct taking into account 
the electoral conditions that, according to the previous finding, favour the occurrence of 
unlawful electoral actions. That is, assuming an expectation of close electoral 
competition and the minimum and maximum levels of electoral proportionality. 
Figure 3 – Probability of observing fraud given electoral misconduct history. 
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systems, ATF values below 0.32, ranges from 0.60 to 0.20 approximately when 
electoral misconduct was used in the past. However, such probabilities range from 0.20 
to 0.02 when no history of electoral misconduct exists. 
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Robustness tests 
The previous findings are further tested against various alternative explanations in order 
to check their robustness. Table 4 shows the different models used when performing 
these tests. Model 1 uses the more conventional log of the average district magnitude 
instead of ATF to measure the performance of the electoral system73. When this variable 
is included, the expected electoral competition is significant but, as is important for the 
argument here, the interaction term between electoral system and competition retains 
both its statistical significance and direction.  
 Model 2 in table 4 looks at institutional change. An implication of the main 
hypothesis of this article is that if some institutional arrangements generate incentives to 
rig elections, then one should observe a certain level of institutional change in those 
situations in which these rules are not favourable for the incumbent74. Model 2 
incorporates a variable that measures the size of the change of ATF in any two 
consecutive elections. The coefficient is not significant and the main coefficients of 
interest remain unaltered. 
 Model 3 includes the democracy index developed in the Polity IV dataset75. 
Since this variable already includes the level of electoral competition in its 
operationalisation, the Polity2 score is lagged one electoral period to avoid endogeneity. 
Once the model is run, both the interaction between the electoral rules and the expected 
level of competition remain statistically significant and with the same direction than the 
original models in table 2. 
 Finally, models 4 and 5 uses some infrastructural –  kilometres of road – and 
state capacity indicator – the proportion of GDP from tax revenue following Fortin-
Rittberger’s main findings76. The sample used in this analysis is also different as most 
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of this data is only available since 1990s. In neither case is the coefficient significant, 
but the interactions of interest remain unaltered.
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Table 4 – Robustness Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 
      
Aver. District (log) -0.74***     
 (0.244)     
Interaction district 0.03***     
 (0.012)     
Change ATF  1.46    
  (3.701)    
Polity2 score (lag)   -0.08*   
   (0.050)   
Roads    -0.00  
    (0.003)  
Taxation     0.25*** 
     (0.088) 
ATF   -13.02*** -10.61*** -25.17*** -9.11*** 
  (3.207) (3.316) (7.266) (2.807) 
Expected competition -0.04** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.26*** -0.11*** 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.027) (0.073) (0.035) 
Interaction ATF  0.32** 0.27** 1.13*** 0.39*** 
  (0.125) (0.109) (0.302) (0.129) 
Previous misconduct 1.95*** 0.38 0.66 1.74*** 2.12* 
 (0.358) (0.401) (0.439) (0.558) (1.109) 
British Legacy -0.79* -1.40*** -1.29** -1.00* -2.68* 
 (0.470) (0.455) (0.506) (0.595) (1.462) 
Authoritarian Legacy -0.12 -0.15 -0.24 2.14*** -1.07 
 (0.567) (0.552) (0.541) (0.791) (0.830) 
GDP (log) 0.13 -0.88*** -0.67** -0.90*** -1.62*** 
 (0.173) (0.311) (0.335) (0.310) (0.626) 
Conflict 0.92*** 1.29*** 1.31*** 4.02*** 3.15*** 
 (0.334) (0.466) (0.423) (1.055) (1.066) 
Ethnicity 0.12 0.12 0.48 -5.09** -1.06 
 (0.689) (0.873) (0.768) (2.029) (1.949) 
Trade  0.00 0.00   
  (0.000) (0.000)   
Agriculture  -0.10*** -0.09**   
  (0.033) (0.036)   
Constant -1.28 11.89*** 10.06** 10.77*** 8.36** 
 (1.514) (3.407) (4.253) (3.451) (3.738) 
      
Observations 184 140 152 84 60 
Dummies past 
elections 
YES YES YES YES YES 
FE YEAR and 
REGION 
YEAR and 
REGION 
YEAR and 
REGION 
YEAR YEAR 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Conclusion 
Political institutions, especially institutions that regulate electoral competition, 
are strong predictors of electoral misconduct in emerging democracies. Two related 
mechanisms operate in this regard. First, when incumbents perceive that the upcoming 
elections will be tight and the electoral rules are majoritarian, the risk for the ruling 
party of becoming an absolute loser in political terms increases. Under this scenario of 
high uncertainty, electoral misconduct may be part of the menu of actions that 
incumbents use to survive in power. This mechanism can, however, be mediated by the 
electoral history of the country. If a country has been successful in running clean 
elections in the past, then the probability of observing electoral misconduct decreases. 
This article contributes to the literature on electoral fraud and institutions by 
incorporating a clear mechanism that links the performance of electoral rules with the 
expected level of competition. This crucial relationship has been mostly overlooked by 
studies showing the strength of electoral rules to explain electoral malpractice or the 
relevance of electoral competition. This relationship is important since under different 
scenarios of electoral competition, institutions may generate different incentives to 
cheat on elections. The data analysed here show that, given various levels of expected 
competition, electoral misconduct is rare under consensus institutions. Electoral 
misconduct is also rare when majoritarian institutions are used and the incumbent has a 
high level of certainty about obtaining an electoral victory. However, if such certainty 
does not exist, the winner-takes-all nature of majoritarian institutions triggers the use of 
electoral fraud.  
Electoral misconduct is also explained by the electoral misconduct history of a 
country. When elections are usually run and managed to a high quality standard, it is 
unlikely that fraud will be observed in a given election. The theoretical justification for 
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this empirical observation could be found in the successful adoption of institutions 
monitoring the quality of the elections. As the literature has recently shown , there 
seems to be a relationship between the quality of elections and the adoption of 
independent electoral management bodies like electoral commissions. When these 
institutions are credible, the quality of elections increases and that may condition the 
strategy of incumbents to rely on electoral misconduct . 
Nevertheless, there are questions that need to be addressed in future research. 
For example, following the work by Przeworski77 one could explore whether alternation 
in power is the key mechanism to explain electoral fraud. I leave this question for 
further research. 
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